Inductivist and Hypothetico-Deductivist Models of Justification
The general philosophical outlook which we are calling the empiricist consensus answered the questionHow does Inductivism attmept to justify laws and theoreis?
of authority by saying, in effect, that we are rational to believe scientific explanations because such
explanations are based on laws or theories which are justified by observational, empirical evidence. Thus
an account of this process by which observational evidence justifies laws and theories lies at the heart
of the empiricist consensus. From the consensus outlook this question was to be answered by providing
a "logic of justification."
Both inductivism and hypothetico-deductivism are philosophical theories designed to account
for how such a logic justifies the laws and theories employed in scientific explanations. Thus they can
be considered as rival philosophical responses to the question of authority, i.e., why is it rational to believe
scientific explanations? For most consensus defenders to say the justificatory relationship between evidence and
that which it supports is a "logical" relation meant in effect that it was a relation between statements.Note: What is tacitly left out of any such an account is an appeal to such "extra-logical" features such as other beliefs of the human scientists who make such "logical inferences," or their professional subculture, or the wider circle of human culture generally with its manifold of different interests.
How does Hypothetico-Deductivism attempt to justify Laws and Theories?